by Maddisen Foster

Maddisen Foster is a Chemical Engineering (Pre-Med) major from Owasso, Oklahoma, who wrote this essay in Catherine Mintler’s Fall 2020 “Doppelgängers and Doubles” course.

“The principle of mass production at last applied to biology.”

-Aldous Huxley, Brave New World

Introduction

In Aldous Huxley’s 1932 dystopian novel Brave New World, he imagined a society in which human beings were created through an assembly line type process, and where their thoughts and desires were conditioned from birth by those in power. Today, we are on the cusp of a technological revolution within the genomics field, and Huxley’s hypotheses might just prove true because “progress in genome-editing technology is enabling deletions and additions in human DNA sequences with greater efficiency, precision and control than ever before” (Isasi 454). According to Kelly Ormond and her associates in “Human Germline Genome Editing,” human genome editing–also known as genome engineering or gene therapy – works by targeting “specific DNA sequences for individual genes or non-coding regions by engineering certain proteins or protein-RNA complexes that can then recognize and bind the sequences and generate single-strand or double-strand DNA breaks . . . it is this cleavage event that can be exploited to create a mutation in, or ‘edit,’ the target gene” (168). The most dangerous type of gene editing, and the primary focus of my essay, is germline genome editing, which is “genome editing that occurs in a germ cell or embryo and results in changes that are theoretically present in all cells of the embryo and that could potentially be passed from the modified individual to offspring” (Ormond et al. 169). While the process of editing a genome may be complicated, the consequences are fairly straightforward: edit a human gene and you can alter the human containing that gene. However, exactly how genetic editing affects a person entirely depends on the intention of the genetic editing.

On the one hand, editing the human genome could offer “lifesaving treatments for diseases such as HIV infection, sickle-cell anemia, and cancers,” as well as the eradication of genomic diseases and extended life expectancy (Ormond et al. 168). But on the other and more troubling hand, this gene editing could also precipitate instances in which genome edits are made not to improve human health but to enhance certain aspects of an individuals’ identity, leading to “dystopian outcomes such as human clones, designer babies, genetic inequity and eugenics” (Critchley 2). Though the discussion surrounding human genome editing’s implementation into society is fascinating, it is not a decidedly useful topic to debate. I agree with philosopher Douglas Walton in his article on the ethics of genetic engineering of humans when he concludes that “the most likely scenario is that there will be a gradual movement towards the adoption of genetic enhancement technology, whether we like it or not” (1516). Rather than debate a subject that is inevitable, it will be much more beneficial to identify how exactly human gene editing will alter humanity, and specifically human identity, and what human gene editing’s possible negative outcomes could be.

Philosopher and professor Christopher Belshaw examines the effects that human genome editing would have on individuals’ identities. He focuses primarily on how genome editing would affect the disabled, but he provides a definition for human identity that will become essential when examining how human identity will be altered by genome editing. After an extensive philosophical evaluation, Belshaw finds that human identity “hinges not around the metaphysical, but the physical, not the recondite, but the everyday” (273). Essentially Belshaw is claiming that our identity, or who we are, is not some abstract concept developed elsewhere and placed inside of us, but rather is dependent upon the little things that we experience daily. It follows, then, that if we change the things we experience, we will change our identity. Because human genome editing would indisputably transform the things we experience, it would also irreversibly alter how we view ourselves and therefore change our identity. For example, if genome editing could eliminate Down syndrome, then that entire group of people, and the diversity they bring, would be lost to society. Thus, for better or worse, human genome editing will allow one human to be inseparably involved in the formation of another human’s identity, so we must ensure that this editing is treated with proper care and seriousness and regarded as an issue that has the potential to alter the entirety of humanity.

Evidence That Human Genome Editing Changes Identity

Belshaw’s conclusions that “identity, at least in large part, involves evident factors” and that “its puzzles and problems are settled by appeal to considerations which, in a fairly ordinary way, are available, and matter to us,” when regarded in the sphere of designer babies and human clones, lead us to determine that these individuals’ identities, when compared to that of unedited beings, would be negatively altered by the editing of their genome (273). Designer babies are babies whose genes are edited to match the specifications of the parents. When discussing this very topic, Kelly Ormond, a genetics professor at Stanford, insists, alongside fellow members of a workgroup from The American Society of Human Genetics, that “arguably, the ability to ‘easily’ request interventions intended to reduce medical risks and costs could make parents less tolerant of perceived imperfections or differences within their families.” She expounds that the “clinical use of germline genome editing might not be in the best interest of the affected individual if it erodes parental instincts for unconditional acceptance” (171). The suggestion here is that genome editing will affect these children’s world experience by negatively modifying the way their parents view them and approve of them.

Just as sure as designer babies will incur changes in their human experience due to their editing, so too will human clones. A human clone is a human who is genetically identical to another individual, and while designer babies and human clones differ in numerous ways, they do coincide in the sense that they would both be beings created from the expertise of humanity, rather than some other force. This is where Leon Kass’s explanation of problems that human cloning causes would connect with our previously discussed arguments concerning human identity. Kass, an American physician and bioethicist, finds that the problem is that any child whose being, character and capacities exist owing to human design does not stand on the same plane as its makers. As with any product of our making, no matter how excellent, the artificer stands above it, not as an equal but as a superior, transcending it by his will and creative prowess. In human cloning, scientists and prospective “parents” adopt a technocratic attitude toward human children: human children become artifacts. Such an arrangement is profoundly dehumanizing, no matter how good the product. (8)

Kass, then, endorses the notion that the creator is always above the created, and that no matter how one looks at it, the created would always feel less than the creator. When human clones are considered in light of this notion, it is revealed that the human clones could never achieve equality with their regular human counterparts simply because these regular human counterparts created them; it is as though these clones are owned by their creator.

Collectively, Ormond and Kass’s statements form the conclusion that human genome editing would adversely affect the edited individuals’ life experiences, and in light of Belshaw’s definition of human identity as dependent upon the mundane and everyday experiences that one has, it becomes clear that in both cases, the edited individual will encounter changes to their identity. In particular, the designer baby’s identity would be altered from that of an unedited individual by the fact that this baby’s parents, according to Ormond and her fellows, would digress from absolute acceptance of it, and thus the child’s experience with its parents would be inferior to that of an unedited child’s. Similarly, Kass argues that a human clone’s identity would differ from an unedited individual’s because a human clone’s life experiences would include the sentiment that it was manufactured by another human being and could never be equal with this human being. In sum, each of these genetically edited beings, whether a designer baby or human clone, would experience adverse changes to their identity, thus demonstrating the need for serious consideration of how human genome editing should best be introduced into and utilized by society.

Human genome editing could also permit the creation of genetically enhanced super soldiers whose identities would be greatly affected due to their editing. One such case was discussed by Steven Metz, a professor of national security and strategy, with a specialty in future warfare, at the U.S. Army War College. Metz announces that “U.S. defense officials and military leaders are understandably interested in producing ‘super soldiers’ using human enhancement technology,” but he then offers some serious questions concerning struggles that these enhanced individuals would face: “Would a military veteran who has been irreversibly enhanced in some way be able to assimilate back into civilian society, or would the veteran have what was seen as unfair advantages over unenhanced humans, thus creating resentment? Would veterans be considered less human than non-enhanced people?” (Metz 1-2). In voicing these questions, Metz asserts that these super soldiers would be noticeably different from the average human being, even though he does not specify the precise details of their differentiation. Regardless of the type of enhancement these super soldiers undergo, so long as these enhancements are perceptibly different from the average human being, their identity will be affected. This is corroborated by Dan W. Brock’s claim that “even in less overtly competitive contexts, we implicitly, and probably in part unavoidably, measure our own accomplishments against the accomplishments of others,” and his conclusion that “the relationship of our functional capacities and capabilities to normal human functions and capabilities is only one significant factor that defines our sense of identity” (21). Here Brock, who was an acclaimed philosopher, bioethicist, and professor emeritus at Harvard University, demonstrates that identity is at least somewhat dependent upon our own capabilities in relation to the perceived normal human capabilities. Therefore, because edited super soldiers’ functioning capacity would be somehow different from unedited individuals as Metz demonstrated, and because, as Brock pointed out, one factor of our identity is our own functioning capacity in relation to that of normal human functioning capacity, a super soldier’s identity would clearly be affected by human genome editing. Without more specific knowledge concerning the edits made within these individuals, we cannot conclusively determine how human identity would be affected by genome editing; we can only state that it will be. This may seem like an inconsequential conclusion, but the ability to alter someone’s identity, whether in a positive or negative way, by altering their genes has potentially catastrophic outcomes because it puts a human being at the complete and utter mercy of its maker, who in the case of genome editing, is an imperfect human. The immense irony becomes clear in that genome editing seeks to create perfection at the hand of imperfect humans and in the process eliminates the very faults that define humanity.

Thus far our discussion has been concerned with how human genome editing will alter the identity of edited individuals, but such editing also has the potential to modify unedited individuals’ identities by means of changing the standards to which society compares itself. Brock asserts in the conclusion of an argumentative essay concerning how human identity will be affected by human genome editing that “if we develop new abilities through genetic engineering or therapy to make widespread enhancements in people’s functional capacities and capabilities, the unenhanced normal level may come to seem to us less significant as a standard against which we will measure ourselves and our own capacities and capabilities” (21-22). He then questions “how secure will one’s pride and self-respect be in a particular capability that, though it exceeds the unenhanced level of normal function, falls short of a widespread enhanced level of that capability that is produced by genetic engineering or therapy?” (Brock 22). The essence of Brock’s statement is that the standard to which we compare ourselves will likely change to account for the abilities that enhanced individuals possess, and that our confidence in ourselves will therefore be affected by this change in standards. When we compare Brock’s statement that we will come to measure ourselves against an unattainable standard with Belshaw’s definition of human identity as dependent upon our everyday circumstances, it becomes clear that the identities of unedited individuals will transform because of human genome editing. Brock also points out that “the understanding of ourselves as sick or diseased tends to correlate fairly closely with our own and others’ sense of us as having suffered some impairment of normal function” and that, because the standard of normal human functioning will change due to enhanced individuals, “the result will be that people who feel healthy and who as yet suffer no functional impairment will increasingly be labelled as unhealthy or diseased” (19-20). For instance, if genome editing eliminated the genetic components of anxiety and depression, and thus caused edited individuals to be less likely to develop these mental health struggles, then the unedited population, who would be more likely to develop anxiety and depression, would be seen as abnormally sensitive and could even be labelled as mentally weak because of the standard for comparison. The assertions made here, when combined with Brock’s other claim that standards for normal human capabilities will change, suggests that unedited individuals will see themselves as somehow disabled because of their lack of editing. This labeling and viewing of average humanity as somehow incorrect or incomplete without human genome editing would certainly change unedited individuals’ identities because their everyday experiences, which have the ability to change identity according to Belshaw, would come to include the idea of them as sick or diseased or disabled. Therefore, the unedited, unenhanced individuals of society would experience changes to their identity due to genome editing because of the modification in standards to which they compare themselves; in short, they would be seen as disabled. Thus, the power of human genome editing to change human identity is once again revealed in a potentially negative way.

Speculation On How Changes In Identity Due To Human Genome Editing Will Alter Humanity

To this point, we have explored the notion that human genome editing will alter both edited and unedited individuals’ identities, but I have refrained from addressing how exactly this alteration of identity will affect these individuals and society because this discussion would be purely speculative. I do, however, think it would be useful to note these potentials to develop a more well-rounded view of the dangers that human genome editing presents, and so the following paragraphs, excluding the conclusion, will contain speculation concerning the effects of these topics.

To start I will examine the possible implications of the changing standards of normalcy, particularly when those standards are set at perfection. For unedited individuals who do not meet up to the standard of perfection that are set out by society due to human genome editing, constant tension would exist, and because humans do not like to live as constant failures, especially if there is an accessible solution to avoid failure, I suggest that society could move towards eliminating all imperfection. This possibility is also suggested by Kelly Ormond and her co-authors when they state that “although the use of human germline genome editing seem unlikely to result in the loss of genetic diversity in future generations in the population as a whole, it could have a greater effect within select subgroups with both the desire and the means to implement specific changes as has already been seen in the case of Downs Syndrome” (Ormond et al. 172). So, if the standard of normalcy is set at perfection, then anyone deemed imperfect by society could be eliminated, and anything added to society by these “unfit” individuals, such as creativity or diversity of thought or distinct perspective, would be lost. Ormond and her colleagues go even further to state that “one concern that arises in discussion of trait selection, prenatal testing, and the potential for gene therapy or gene editing is the possibility that allowing parents the choice to control aspects of their child’s genetic inheritances (procreative autonomy) could create expectations of this sort of control or even obligations to ‘create the best children’ in what has been called procreative beneficence” (Ormond et al. 172). The implications of this statement are that not only could human genome editing lead to the eradication of certain individuals, such as those with Down Syndrome, but also that it could lead to an elimination of all individuals with any imperfection at all. This is confirmed by Ormond’s claim that parents will desire or be expected to edit their children to perfection as genome editing becomes more widespread. While the impacts of this removal of deficiency would have an immense range, one particular outcome could be that, because shared imperfections and hardships often bond people, the termination of imperfection could lead to a more emotionally isolated humanity. The elimination of imperfection could also lead to a world in which there is no incentive or need to improve or work, so humanity could become exceedingly lethargic or indifferent or uninspired. Thus, the potential dangers of recklessly pursuing human genome editing are the elimination of specific groups of people and/or the elimination of all individuals with any perceived flaws. The impacts of these eliminations on society are too numerous to count, but they would nonetheless alter entirely and irreversibly the existence of humanity.

Furthermore, if we return to our discussion on super soldiers we will once again see that genome editing could be catastrophic if pursued here in the wrong way. Not only would strain be placed on these soldiers themselves, but society would also have to change to account for these individuals’ existence, which could have some very negative effects, such as decreased motivation or a devaluing of average humans. For the super soldiers themselves, they would have to wrestle with the fact that who they are is, at least in some respects, a product of scientists. This may cause extreme discomfort or confusion for these individuals, or, as Metz pointed out in his discussion of super soldiers, their ostracism from society because of their differences. Super soldiers could also face tension due to the expectations of them to perform solely for their creation as soldiers and could find it difficult to assimilate into society because of the way they were made. Christopher E. Sawin, a U.S. Marine Corps veteran, considered in his essay “Creating Super Soldiers for Warfare: A Look into the Laws of War” that “it is also possible that these enhanced super soldiers would no longer resemble human beings. The risk of super soldiers separating from human intuitions is that it could lead to indiscriminate killings through the inability to distinguish between a civilian and an enemy combatant during times of war or armed conflict” (Sawin 117). Additionally, these individuals’ existence could influence the identity of humans that were not edited because of how these unedited individuals would come to understand themselves in relation to modified humans. For instance, if a super soldier was created that could perform all the tasks needed by the military, then regular, unmodified humans would become less significant and useful to the military. If some kind of synthetic human could be made that was perfect, then average humans would become less important as well and a complete redefining of what constitutes a productive member of humanity would follow. Clearly, the potentials that human genome editing creates could cause some very interesting situations for humans, and so it is imperative that we consider these potentials and do our best to avoid the negative outcomes so that we can have genome editing technology and all the potentially positive benefits previously mentioned, such as treatments for and eradication of genomic diseases and extended life expectancy, that accompany it with fewer negative consequences.

Lastly, I want to address the potential outcomes associated with designer babies and human clones, such as a loss of empathy due to a failure to meet expectations. In the case of designer babies, as Ormond and her workmates pointed out, parents could become less accepting of their children’s imperfections because of the parents’ direct involvement in the characteristics that that child has. A loss of empathy could result due to the fact that the parents will express less understanding towards their children and their children’s imperfections, which could in turn lead the children to exhibit less empathy towards other individuals. If this cycle were abundantly reproduced, it could result in an altogether decrease in empathy throughout the world, and, because empathy allows us to connect with others, a decrease in empathy could result in an absence of meaningful human connection. These claims may seem outlandish or far-fetched, but a similar situation occurs in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World in which society is made up of identical human embryos conditioned to think of themselves and others in certain ways. It is true that Brave New World is a work of fiction; however, Leon Kass argues in “Preventing a Brave New World” that if you “just give us the technological imperative, liberal democratic society, compassionate humanitarianism, moral pluralism and free markets, and we can take ourselves to a Brave New World all by ourselves – even without deliberately deciding to go” (3-4). He further expresses that “indeed, creating and manipulating life in the laboratory is the gateway to a Brave New World, not only in fiction but also in fact” (Kass 3-4). Here Kass demonstrates that we are already moving towards a society similar to that of Brave New World’s, so its themes can be utilized to understand the possibilities of human genome editing in the current world.

Now we can once again return to our discussion of designer babies and a loss of empathy that would be developed by their creation through examining one of the main characters of Brave New World, Lenina, and her loss of empathy for the less enticing parts of humanity. When Lenina encounters true humanity on a Reservation for the savages of society, or those who are not genetically modified, she expresses extreme disgust for these individuals’ imperfections. For example, after seeing an old person for the first time, she exclaims “‘What’s the matter with him?’”, her eyes “wide with horror and amazement” at the sight of this old man (Huxley 83). Here Lenina is unable to understand the unappealing parts of humanity that have been eliminated from her society, and this expresses that human genome editing could lead individuals to lose empathy for imperfections, or things perceived as imperfections. Thus, a loss of empathy could ensue due to the creation of designer babies and human clones, and this could have extremely negative impacts on the world at large, once again demonstrating the need for regulation on human genome editing.

Conclusion

While no one can know for sure the true impacts of human genome editing, it is clear that identity, both the identity of the edited and unedited, will be impacted, and it is also clear that the way it is impacted has the potential to irrevocably change humanity. I wanted to focus my argument on human identity and the possibility for its alteration through human genome editing because I believe that the day our identity, who we are both internally and externally, can be manipulated by another human being is the day we give someone the power to destroy our humanity, not necessarily by killing it physically, but through attacking the very things that make life worthwhile. What could happen to things like compassion or generosity or friendship or love in a world where we are perfect from the start? Will these human emotions that we hold so dear become so unnecessary to our life that they disappear altogether? And what, then, would be the point of living? While I was unable to discuss it within my essay, human genome editing also has the potential to alter what we think about equality of opportunity, particularly about how far we should go to implementing this equality, and what the effects of complete equality are. It could also create confusion surrounding the identity of individuals due to the fluidity of physical characteristics that could accompany human genome editing. Whatever the outcomes may be, I do not deny Leon Kass’s statement that through human genome editing “human nature itself lies on the operating table, ready for alteration, for eugenic and psychic ‘enhancement,’ for wholesale re-design” (1) and I am forced to ask myself, as you should too, if humanity will be able to withstand the precarious potentials that genome editing welcomes.

Works Cited

Belshaw, Christopher. “Identity and Disability.” Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 3, 2000, pp. 263–276. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24354020.

Brock, Dan W. “The Human Genome Project and Human Identity.” Houston Law Review, vol. 29, no. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 7-22. HeinOnline, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/hulr29&i=17.

Critchley, Christine, et al. “Predicting Public Attitudes Toward Gene Editing of Germlines: The Impact of Moral and Hereditary Concern in Human and Animal Applications,” edited by Go Yoshizawa, Frontiers in Genetics, 9 Jan. 2019. https://doi.org/10.3389/fgene.2018.00704.

Ormond, Kelly E., et al. “Human Germline Genome Editing.” The American Journal of Human Genetics, vol. 101, issue 2, 3 Aug. 2017, pp. 167-176. ScienceDirect, www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929717302471.

Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World. 1932. Chelsea House, 2019.

Isasi, Rosario, and Bartha M. Knoppers. “Oversight of human inheritable genome modification.” Nature Biotechnology, vol. 33, May 12, 2015, pp. 454–455. https://doi.org/10.1038/nbt.3231.

Kass, Leon R. “Preventing a Brave New World.” Human Life Review, vol. 27, no. 3, Summer 2001, p.14. EBSCOhost, https://web.p.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=7b07aca9-2c9e-4422-8984-9a0aaf7b08f3%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=5438301&db=aph.

Metz, Steven. “How Far Can the U.S. Military Go to Building a Technology-Enhanced ‘Super Soldier’?” World Politics Review (Selective Content), Sept. 2016, pp.1-3. EBSCOhost, http://libraries.ou.edu/access.aspx?url=https://search-ebscohost-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=118337056&site=ehost-live

Sawin, Christopher E. “Creating Super Soldiers for Warfare: A Look into the Laws of War.” Journal of High Technology Law, vol. 17, no. 1, 2016, pp. 105-140. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/jhtl17&i=117.

Walton, Douglas. “The Slippery Slope Argument in the Ethical Debate on Genetic Engineering of Humans.” Science and Engineering Ethics, 23, 2017, pp. 1507–1528. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-016-9861-3.